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Abstract 
 
 
A broad range of behavior is associated with crossmodal perception in the arts. Philosophical explanations of 
crossmodal perception often make reference to neuroscientific discussions of multisensory integration in 
selective attention. This research demonstrates that superior colliculus plays a regulative role in attention, 
integrating unique modality specific visual, auditory, and somatosensory spatial maps into a common spatial 
framework for action, and that motor skill, emotional salience, and semantic salience contribute to the 
integration of auditory, visual, and somatosensory information in ordinary perceptual contexts. I present a 
model for multisensory integration in our engagement with artworks derived from a diagnostic recognition 
framework for object recognition and a biased competition model for selective attention. The proposed model 
attributes a role to superior colliculus in a broader fronto-parietal attentional network that integrates sensory 
information, primes perceptual systems to the expectation of stimulus features salient to particular 
sensorimotor or cognitive tasks at particular locations, and inhibits the perception of task irrelevant distracters. 
I argue that this model demonstrates that crossmodal effects are the rule not the exception in perception and 
discuss ways in which it explains a range of crossmodal effects in our engagement with pictures, dance, and 
musical performances. 
 
 
 
Can music sound like a gesture or a bodily posture? Can sense modalities be crossed 
that way? There certainly is plenty of room for doubt about it?1 
 
A broad range of behavior is associated with crossmodal perception in the arts: we hear the 
sounds of a movie emanating from the location of the visual event it depicts, not one 
determined by the arrangement of the speakers that surround us in the theater; the perceived 
duration of a note we hear is influenced by the gesture with which we see it performed; 
motor skill and perceived task difficulty can influence the way we hear music and see the 
_____________________________ 
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spatial layout of events depicted in pictures; we often report that the music we hear feels sad 
or exuberant; and emotionally expressive music is used to direct attention to salient visible 
features of film scenes. Some of these examples are garden variety cases of crossmodal 
effects in ordinary perception. Others can seem quite surprising. However, on closer look 
they too are perhaps just what is to be expected. Perception did not arise in a vacuum. 
Perceptual systems evolved in lock step with bodies, and more importantly the structure and 
function of perceptual systems are intrinsically related to our goals, cognitive capacities, 
and bodily capabilities. Selectivity is, from this perspective, a critical feature of perception. 
Perceptual systems must enable organisms to quickly and efficiently identify, and orient 
themselves to, features salient to their current goals in an environment replete with sensory 
information. Evidence suggests that perceptual systems accomplish this task by selecting 
minimal sets of features diagnostic for, or sufficient to determine the identity, shape, 
location, and affordances of, objects and events in the environment. Crossmodal effects play 
a key role in these perceptual processes. For instance, in ordinary contexts sounds occur at 
the locations of, and in temporal register with, the objects, actions, or events that produce 
them. This entails that the conjunction of a minimal set of spatio-temporally coincident 
auditory and visual cues diagnostic for task salient aspects of an object or event are 
sufficient to identify and locate it.2 Similarly, the perceptible aspects of objects and their 
affordances change in predictable ways as we move through the environment and orient our 
bodies to interact with them. The systematic relationship between movement dynamics and 
perceptual change entails that motor planning, preparation, and simulation can be used to 
generate forward models of environmental dynamics that direct attention and influence 
sensory encoding of task salient aspects of perceived events.3 
 
A critical question arises in these contexts. How do perceptual systems assign salience to 
environmental features? One means is simple perceptual salience. Novel perceptual features 
and those that contrast starkly with their surround draw attention to themselves because they 
stand out in a crowd. However, the critical features salient to a task are not always the most 
perceptually salient. Cognitive systems must therefore include a means to flexibly bias 
responses to sensory stimuli independent of perceptual salience. Biased competition models 
for selective attention demonstrate that the perceived salience of environmental features is 
mediated by top-down cortico-thalamic networks that converge on the superior colliculus 
(SC), a multisensory area in the midbrain where spatial maps from different modalities are 
brought into register, and thereby influence the encoding of those features at all levels of 
visual, auditory, and somatosensory processing.4 A similar story can be told about the 
perceived emotional salience of environmental features. Emotional attention biases the 
encoding of task salient aspects of objects and events via a fronto-amygdala network that 
includes projections to sensory cortices.  
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The suggestion that I am making is that perceptual and affective systems are deeply 
interconnected via crossmodal cortico-thalamic attentional networks that enhance the 
flexibility of goal directed behavior. What is the explanatory payout of this view for 
philosophical questions about art? Artists develop productive strategies through systematic 
explorations of the behavioral effects of different sets of formal and compositional 
arrangements within a medium. Artworks can, as a consequence, be conceptualized as 
stimuli intentionally designed to trigger perceptual, affective, and cognitive responses 
diagnostic for their content in viewers, spectators, listeners, and readers. This entails that 
questions about the understanding and appreciation of art include questions about the way 
viewers, spectators, listeners, and readers acquire, represent, manipulate, and use 
information embedded in the formal structure of artworks in order to recognize and evaluate 
their content. My suspicion is that these data can contribute to a broad range of debates 
about the nature of art and the character of aesthetic experience. I can, of course, imagine 
some skepticism about this claim. However, we can all agree that philosophical theories 
about art and aesthetics must be consistent with psychological facts about our engagement 
with artworks. Therefore, questions like these about the construction and reception of 
artworks are not philosophically trivial. 
 
In what follows I present a model for multisensory integration in our engagement with 
artworks derived from Phillipe Schyns’s diagnostic recognition framework for object 
recognition and a biased competition model for selective attention.5 My plan is to back my 
way into the issue of crossmodal perception in the arts using a grab bag of examples that 
illustrate the relationship between diagnosticity, attention, and biased competition in 
perception. I will then detail the model and discuss how it generalizes to include the roles of 
multisensory integration, motor simulation, and affective salience in our engagement with 
artworks. Along the way I will knowingly and willfully commit the crime of 
visuocentrism.6 My reasons are methodological. The philosophical crime of visuocentrism, 
as I understand it, has two related aspects. It is both the mistake of making unfounded 
ontological claims about things like sounds based on ontological claims about things like 
visible objects, and the mistake of making unfounded phenomenological claims about 
experiences in other modalities based on an understanding of visual phenomenology. These 
are good worries. However, the analogy that grounds the influence of vision research on our 
understanding of other sense modalities is neither phenomenological nor ontological in 
these senses. Rather it is architectural, based in the topological organization of critical areas 
at all levels of perceptual processing systems (e.g., retinotopic organization of geometric 
space in visual areas, tonotopic organization of pitch space in auditory areas, and 
somatotopic maps of body space in somatosensory and motor areas) and the hierarchical 
organization of top-down and bottom-up influences in sensory processing. These facts 
ground structural analogies between visual, auditory, and somatosensory processing systems 
that can be used as heuristic devices to promote a better understanding of our perceptual 
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engagement with the environment. 
 
 
1. Some Examples 
 
Example 1. Imagine that this is a lecture on Clement Greenberg and abstract expressionism. 
Greenberg claimed that the practices of art are grounded in explorations of medium specific 
constraints on artistic production. In this context I would talk about the way abstract 
expressionists highlighted the flatness of the canvas, the viscosity of paint, and the texture of 
their brushstrokes. I might show the following illustration and categorize it as an Abstract 
Expressionist lithograph from the 1950s.7 Perhaps I would mention that it exhibits a bit of a 
Japanese influence. If all goes well the students would see a composition in low relief 
constructed from two brush strokes, or more accurately a brush stroke and a dab. 
 
 
 
 
Now, let’s change the story a little bit. Imagine instead that I have presented this image as 
an example of the influence of Sumi-e painting on late modernist abstraction. The goal of 
Sumi-e painting is, as I understand it, to distill the essence of a subject in the fewest possible 
strokes. I might, in this context, categorize the work as an abstract landscape and tell a story 
about the efficient means it uses to depict a cabin splashed in sunlight deep in a valley at the 
base of a mountain range. I would likely mention the larger mountain looming in shadow in 
the background to make sure the students noticed it. If all went well they would easily see 
these objects in depth in the depicted landscape. 
 
Of course, this image actually belongs in a class on twentieth-century European history, not 
philosophy of art. It is neither an abstract composition nor a serene landscape. It is a work of 
political satire, a caricature of Adolf Hitler. There is nothing particularly crossmodal about 
our engagement with this image (although my guess is that a visuomotor sense of gesture 
plays a role in our appreciation of its aesthetic quality – a quality emergent in the contrast 
between its emotionally charged representational content and the still fluidity of Hyman's 
brush strokes). So what’s the point? The exercise illustrates the influence of cue 
diagnosticity in perception. Object recognition and identification are goal directed tasks in 
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which perceptual systems parse sensory inputs into salient cues, group these cues together 
into perceptual objects, and assign them to categories. Schyns argues that changing the 
category to which we assign a range of perceptual cues can alter their diagnosticity and even 
change the way we perceive them.8 In this case, if the example worked correctly, changing 
the category of art to which the image belonged changed what was seen from two objects in 
shallow relief (brushstrokes), to three objects in long perspective (a cabin and two 
mountains), to one object in depth defined by three parts (hair, face, and moustache) – this 
is what I generally find when I use this example in lectures. So the example demonstrates 
that art historical categories directly influence the diagnosticity of, and as a result the way 
we perceive, the formal features of an artwork. These perceptual effects, in turn, shape the 
content and artistic qualities of the works as we experience them (e.g., the juxtaposition of 
stillness and tension in Hyman’s ink drawing). 
 
Example 2 (see Figure 1, following page). Transformational apparent motion differs from 
its more familiar cousin, translational apparent motion. In the latter case, figures presented 
alternately at one location and then another are seen to move back and forth between them. 
In the former case, a second of two spatially overlapping figures appears to grow out of the 
first as if the display were animated using a sequence of shapes. Peter Tse & Patrick 
Cavanaugh have demonstrated that visuomotor interactions influence the perception of 
transformational apparent motion.9 Participants in Tse and Cavanaugh’s study sat in front of 
a computer screen that displayed the Chinese character below. They were instructed that the 
kanji would disappear and then reappear stroke by stroke. The order in which the strokes 
reappeared was the order they would have naturally been drawn if one were writing in 
Chinese. The experimental task was to maintain fixation on the dot in the middle of the 
display and report on the appearance of the last stroke. Critically, and unbeknownst to the 
participants, the strokes were not drawn in any direction, but rather appeared on the screen 
all at once.  
 
Ten American and 10 Chinese students studying in the United States participated in the 
experiment. The American students were all native English speakers and knew no Chinese. 
The Chinese students were all native Chinese speakers, had been in the United States fewer 
than 10 years, had been at least 18 years old when they came to America, and knew how to 
write the character. All participants were naïve to the purpose of the study. Tse and 
Cavanaugh hypothesized that native Chinese speakers would see the final stroke appear 
from left to right, as if it had been drawn in, and that American participants would see it 
grow out of the long dog-leg stroke from right to left, consistent with basic perceptual 
grouping processes.10 The results of the study confirmed this prediction. Interestingly, 
Chinese participants with psychophysics backgrounds that were familiar with the relevant 
perceptual grouping processes all saw the final stroke drawn in from left to right as it should  
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Figure 1. Kanji stimulus used to construct a transformational apparent motion display by tse and 
Cavanaugh to measure the influence of top down processes in perception. Reprinted from Peter U. 
Tse and Patrick Cavanaugh, “Chinese and Westerners See Opposite Apparent Motions in a Kanji 
Stimulus,” Cognition 74, no. 3, (2000): B27-B32. B29, with permission from Elsevier. 
 
be drawn. Likewise, American students continued to perceive the direction of motion of the 
appearance of the last stroke from right to left after they were told how to draw the kanji in 
debriefing. The conjunction of these latter results demonstrates that motor skill and not 
declarative knowledge is the productive variable in this perceptual effect. 
 
Tse and Cavanaugh’s study demonstrates that top-down influences, in this case expectations 
associated with well developed motor programs for writing in a native language, can 
override basic bottom-up perceptual processes. For the purposes of this paper the points of 
interest are that the presence of a well-developed motor skill influenced the diagnosticity of 
a static visual cue, this change in diagnosticity altered the perceived direction of apparent of 
motion, and these perceptual effects were associated with activation of the human visual 
motion area (hMT+), which is associated with the perception of generic visual cues.11 These 
results demonstrate a crossmodal visuomotor interaction between motor programs 
associated with a developed motor skill and the perceptual processing of generic motion 
cues in the visual system. 
 
Example 3 (see Figure 2, following page). Maggie Shiffrar has demonstrated similar results 
for translational apparent motion in biological apparent motion displays.12 Translational 
apparent motion ordinarily follows the shortest possible path, giving the appearance in some 
cases of passing through figures that are in the way. This is the case both with abstract 
geometric figures and inanimate objects (e.g., a dot presented alternately on either side of an 
intervening rectangle will be seen to pass through it, and a ruler that appears to rotate on an 
axis like a clock hand will be seen to move through an object in its motion path). Apparent 
motion displays that are constructed from sequences of body postures violate this principle, 
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but with a caveat. If the interval between the presentations of the two images (defined as 
“stimulus onset asynchrony” or SOA) is very short, the perceived apparent motion will 
follow the shortest, or direct, path, passing through intervening body parts and violating the 
constraints of natural joint movements.13 However, at longer SOAs the apparent motion in 
these displays follows longer, or indirect, biologically possible movement paths, mimicking 
natural joint movement and appearing to go around intervening objects and body parts. 
Inanimate objects, in contrast, never appear to follow indirect physically possible paths 
(e.g., a volleyball presented alternately near the edge of a table and on the floor beside it 
will not appear to roll off the table at slower SOAs, but rather will always appear to travel 
through the table top).14 The perception of both direct motion paths and biologically natural 
indirect motion paths are associated with the selective activation of hMT+ in these contexts. 
However, only the perception of biologically natural indirect motion paths is associated 
with the activation of premotor and motor areas.15 This suggests a processing time 
explanation for biological apparent motion. At longer SOAs, when there is sufficient 
processing time for the visual system to recruit premotor and motor areas involved in motor 
planning, motor preparation, and the performance of depicted actions, we see natural 
biological motion paths. At shorter SOAs the visual system treats the same image features 
as generic visual motion cues. These data further illustrate the influence of context on the 
diagnosticity of visual cues and demonstrate that crossmodal visuomotor interactions are not 
limited to contexts of motor expertise, but rather contribute more generally to the perception 
of natural biological motion cues. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Two images used to construct a stimulus to test the influence of processing time and 
natural joint constraints on the perception of biological motion. Shiffrar and Freyd report that 
perceived apparent motion violates natural joint constraints in biological apparent motion displays at 
stimulus onset asynchronies shorter than 300 milliseconds.16 
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Example 4: Jennifer Freyd's studies of representational momentum in picture perception 
demonstrate that viewers use implicit perceptual knowledge of biological motion and event 
dynamics to construct dynamic mental representations of the depicted momentum of objects 
and agents in static images of events and actions. For instance, when an abstract visual 
pattern is presented with an implied rotation, an observer's memory of the orientation of that 
pattern is displaced in the direction of that implied rotation.17 Similarly, when pairs of 
frozen-action photographs depicting an action (e.g., jumping off a low wall) are presented 
rapidly in sequence (like sets of film stills), participants are slower to identify the second of 
the pair as different if the images are presented in the correct, as opposed to reverse, 
temporal order. A range of imaging studies demonstrates that crossmodal visuomotor 
interactions are involved in the production of these effects. The perception of 
representational momentum in kanji and handwritten letters is associated with enhanced 
activity in somatotopically organized premotor and motor areas associated with 
handwriting.18 Zoe Kourtzi has found enhanced activity in areas associated with the 
perception of both biological (superior temporal sulcus) and generic motion (hMT+) cues 
during the perception of frozen action photographs of athletes and animals, but not 
photographs of athletes or animals at rest.19 Finally, Cosimo Urgesi has recorded motor 
evoked potentials in muscles associated with the performance of depicted actions during 
picture viewing. The presence of motor evoked potentials in passive perceptual contexts 
indicates activity in premotor areas associated with motor planning, preparation, and 
simulation.20  
 
Example 5. The range of studies discussed above demonstrates that our responses to static 
and animated depictions of actions are embodied and involve crossmodal visuomotor 
perceptual processes. The following studies demonstrate that analogous processes 
contribute to viewers’ engagement with affective pictures, the apprehension and 
understanding of the expressive qualities of dance and musical performances, and the 
relationship between the expressive properties of dance and music more generally. Facial 
mimicry and associated affective responses have been shown to play a constitutive role in 
our capacity to recognize and understand the emotions of others, demonstrating that we use 
our own bodies to model salient aspects of the affective states of others in interpersonal 
interactions and other social contexts.21 Studies of viewers’ responses to photographs from 
the International Affective Picture System demonstrate analogous correlations between 
facial mimicry and depicted expressions.22 Further, judgments about the valence of the 
emotion expressed in photographic portraits are correlated with low level 
electromyographic responses in patterns of facial muscles active in the depicted expression, 
and strong correlations have been observed between subjective judgments about the 
magnitude of arousal depicted in these kinds of photographic portraits and autonomic 
measures of skin conductance and heart rate. These results hold for the perception of both 
positively and negatively valenced expressions and generalize to musical contexts. Valence 
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and arousal judgments in response to expressive music are correlated with the same range of 
facial responses and autonomic measures.23 This range of studies demonstrates a 
crossmodal interaction between sensorimotor and affective processing that is manifest in a 
sympathetic relationship between the mere perception of an emotion in a picture or piece of 
music, the muscles used to express that emotion, and the range of autonomic responses 
constitutive of the feeling of that emotion.  
 
The results of these studies generalize to the perception of emotions embodied in 
movements and postures.24 Claire Roether and her colleagues have demonstrated that we 
recognize the emotions of agents in their gait. Further, Roether was able to isolate and use 
affective postural and biological movement cues to construct artificial walkers with 
recognizably expressive gaits. Tanya Clarke has demonstrated, similarly, that we are able to 
recognize the emotions expressed by speakers in point-light displays of interpersonal 
dialogue, and Winand Dittrich has shown that viewers are able to recognize the emotions 
expressed by dancers in point-light displays of choreographed dance movements.25 Point-
light displays of biological movement are constructed by attaching lights or reflective tape 
at a performers joints and videotaping their movements. Experimenters adjust brightness 
and contrast in the video so that the points of light representing the relative movement of the 
joints are all that is visible. The result is a stimulus that contains only information about the 
form of the movement (i.e., it represents the form of the movement in the absence of any 
information about the visual appearance of the actors). Viewers readily recognize biological 
(but not non-biological) movement in these types of stimuli.26 Together, these studies 
demonstrate that biological motion cues are alone sufficient to express an emotion, 
independent of other visual cues. 
 
Recall that I began the paper with a question about whether a segment of music could sound 
like a bodily gesture. Psychologists interested in dance have studied this question from the 
opposite perspective – can dance movements look like the expressive qualities of the music 
to which they are choreographed. For instance, Carol Krumhansl and Diana Schenck asked 
participants to use a foot pedal to make continuous judgments about the amount of either 
tension or emotion expressed at any given time in a videotape of an excerpt of Ballanchine’s 
ballet for Mozart’s Divertimento No. 15. Perceived tension is, as a general rule, strongly 
correlated with autonomic measures of arousal (e.g., skin conductance, respiration, and 
heart rate) and subjective measures of the strength of experienced emotions (e.g., 
continuous measures or verbal reports).27 Therefore, perceived tension is often used as an 
index of the expressive quality of music. This is consistent with a general claim within the 
philosophy and psychology literature that the expressive qualities of a piece of music are 
carried in, or emerge from, the ebb and flow of tension produced by its rhythmic, tonal, and 
harmonic dynamics.28 Participants were divided into three groups in which they either only 
heard (AO), only saw (VO), or both heard and saw (AV) the video.29 Continuous judgments 
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of tension and emotion were strongly correlated across all three experimental conditions. 
Further, the additive combination of AO and VO responses could be used to model and 
predict AV responses in both cases. These results demonstrate a crossmodal audio-visual 
interaction in spectators’ engagement with the work.  
 
Bradley Vines and his colleagues used an analogous experimental design to explore whether 
visual information carried in the gestures of performers can be used to modulate the 
perceived expressive qualities of musical performances.30 Trained musicians in Vine’s 
study made continuous judgments in either an AO, VO, or AV conditions about the amount 
of tension experienced in videotaped performances of Stravinsky's Second Piece for 
Clarinet Solo. As in Krumhansl and Schenck, measurements of tension in the AV condition 
could be modeled as a function of the combined measurements of tension from the AO and 
VO conditions. The perception of smooth and controlled body movements served to 
dampen the tension experienced in high pitched, loud, fast moving musical contours in the 
AV condition relative to the AO condition. Conversely, the perception of punctuated, highly 
expressive movements increased the tension experienced in quiet and subdued musical 
passages. However, in these cases, the result was greater than the additive combination of 
the two measurements alone. 
 
Catherine Chapados and Daniel Levitin used skin conductance (electrodermal activity, or 
EDA) as an autonomic measure of arousal in a follow-up to Vines’s study.31 EDA generally 
followed similar contours in all three conditions. Correlations between EDA and subjective 
measures of tension from the original study were strongest for the AV condition. Further, 
EDA measures for the AV condition were generally greater than the additive sum of, and 
could be modeled as a function of, the AO and VO measures. Finally, the level of EDA, 
consistent with the tension measures recorded in the original study, varied between 
modalities of presentation in some places. These correlations were contextually dependent 
on the musical events taking place at those points in the performance of the piece. This is 
not surprising. The expressive information carried in the VO and AO conditions is 
dramatically different in the examples discussed at the end of the last paragraph (the 
expressive information in the high pitched loud and fast musical passage is distinct from, 
and contrasts with, the expressive information carried in the visible aspects of the 
performer's smooth, fluid playing style). Therefore, although these two stimuli are 
contextually related as aspects of the temporal, rhythmic, and harmonic structure of the 
musical performance, one would expect modality specific differences in associated tension 
measures when they are experienced in isolation from one another. 
 
The points of interest for our discussion in this range of studies are twofold. First, music and 
bodily movements are each equally expressive of emotions and can be used to convey the 
same expressive information. Second, the diagnosticity of visuomotor cues carried in the 
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bodily movements of performers influenced the diagnosticity of auditory cues and thereby 
modulated the experience of the expressive qualities of the music. The conjunction of these 
results demonstrate that the expressive qualities of dance and musical performance emerge 
from crossmodal interactions between auditory, visuomotor, and affective processing … 
and that there is a very real sense in which an expressive bodily gesture can look like music 
sounds. 
 
 
2. A Diagnostic Recognition Model for Crossmodal Perception in the Arts 
 
The demands of quick and flexible behavior in a dense and noisy sensory environment 
necessitate strategies for sorting and filtering sensory information. Selective attention is an 
efficient means to address this problem. Attention can be directed to locations, modality 
specific sensory features, objects, events, or their parts. Biased competition models of 
attention propose that these kinds of environmental features “compete” for neural 
representation in perception. Consistent with this claim, goal directed selective attention has 
been demonstrated to bias the firing rates of populations of neurons in the visual systems as 
early LGN, SC, and pulvinar (PU). These processes have been shown to enhance the firing 
rates of populations of neurons that encode the presence of task salient features at expected 
locations and inhibit the encoding of local distracters. They are thereby mechanisms that 
flexibly influence the sensory content of perceptual experience and minimize the 
computational costs of information processing in perceptual contexts by focusing attention 
on minimal sets of task salient diagnostic features. 32  
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Figure 3. An Biased Competition Model for Integrating Crossmodal Influences in Perception. 
Feedback projections and reciprocal connectivity tune the firing rates of neurons that encode for 
behaviorally salient environmental features throughout the visual system. The ebb and flow of 
information back and forth through the system enhances and inhibits activation patterns, and thereby 
biases population codes of neurons to current behavioral goals. Crossmodal sensory information is 
integrated into these processes via superior colliculus. The brain areas described in this schematic 
model are densely interconnected. For instance, pulvinar is reciprocally connected with prefrontal, 
parietal, and inferior temporal visual areas as well as areas of orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate 
cortex that encode the affective significance of perceptual stimuli. For the sake of clarity only 
connectivity critical to the crossmodal integration of sensorimotor, affective, and multisensory 
information is represented in the figure. ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; dlPFC, dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex; FEF, frontal eye fields; LGN, lateral geniculate nucleus; hMT+, medial temporal 
area; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; PEF, parietal eye fields; PM, premotor cortex; PUL, pulvinar; SC, 
superior colliculus; SMA, supplementary motor area; TE/TEO, inferior temporal areas; V1/V4, visual 
cortex; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex.33 
 
 
Biased competition models for selective attention identify broad fronto-parietal networks 
that mediate the perception of diagnostic cues via top-down feedback.34 In the case of visual 
perception these feedback projections include: projections from areas of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex that are associated with spatial working memory to the frontal eye fields, 
brain regions associated with endogenous, or internally directed, shifts of attention; 
projections from these same parts of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to areas TE and TEO in 
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the inferior temporal cortex, brain regions critical for recognizing complex visual patterns 
and the shapes of objects; projections from the supplementary motor area and the premotor 
cortex, brain regions that are associated with motor planning, preparation, and simulation, to 
those same regions of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex involved in spatial working 
memory;35 projections from supplementary motor areas and premotor cortex to the parietal 
eye fields, brain regions also associated with shifts of attention; projections from TE and 
TEO to earlier visual areas V4 and hMT+ that are responsible for culling color, abstract 
pattern, and motion information from sensory inputs; and projections from dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, supplementary motor areas, premotor cortex, and both the frontal and 
parietal eye fields to the pulvinar and lateral geniculate nucleus in the thalamus via superior 
colliculus.36 The lateral geniculate nucleus is a primary relay station for retinal inputs en 
route to the visual areas in the occipital cortex. Attentional priming to the lateral geniculate 
nucleus both enhances the firing rates of populations of neurons that encode target features 
and facilitates synchronization among them. Pulvinar is a topologically organized structure 
in the thalamus that receives retinal inputs, has been shown to contain populations of 
neurons sensitive to orientation and motion information, is reciprocally connected with all 
areas of the visual system and is integrated with prefrontal and parietal areas implicated in 
attentional priming via direct feedback and its connectivity with the superior colliculus. 
 
The critical feature of this model is the connectivity from prefrontal areas to the pulvinar 
and the lateral geniculate nucleus via the superior colliculus. The superior colliculus can be 
divided functionally into two regions: a superficial layer involved in visual processing and a 
deep layer composed of largely multisensory visual-auditory-somatosensory neurons. 
Superficial and deep layers of the superior colliculus are topologically organized and 
interconnected. Multisensory neurons in the deep layer of the superior colliculus, as 
mentioned above, receive top-down inputs from areas in the visual, auditory, and 
somatosensory cortices, from multisensory areas in posterior parietal cortex, and prefrontal 
and parietal areas associated with directing eye movements in endogenously, or internally, 
cued shifts of attention. Outputs from the superior colliculus project to the visual system via 
the pulvinar and the lateral geniculate nucleus and to the auditory system via the inferior 
colliculus and the medial geniculate nucleus in the auditory thalamus. The role of the 
superior colliculus in these contexts is to bring auditory, somatosensory, and visual spatial 
maps into register in order to direct attention and integrate discrete unimodal visual, 
auditory, and somatosensory information into a coherent multisensory representation of the 
environment.37 An analogous story can be told about the auditory system. Inferior colliculus 
is a topologically organized structure that receives top-down input from the auditory cortex, 
has a large population of auditory-somatosensory multisensory neurons, and is implicated in 
a cortico-thalamic auditory attentional network that analogously enhances the encoding of 
task salient auditory features and inhibits the perception of local distracters.38 Therefore, the 
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superior colliculus is in a prime position to mediate crossmodal perceptual effects on 
unimodal processing in human auditory and visual systems. 
 
My argument is that biased competition models represent a global architectural strategy in 
perceptual processing. Research demonstrating that sensory processing is influenced by the 
affective significance of environmental stimuli via an independent, parallel, emotional 
attention system provides support for this claim.39 Affective processing in both visual and 
auditory cases has traditionally been thought to be divided into a low road and a high road. 
The low road is mediated by direct connectivity from the sensory periphery to the 
amygdala. This pathway is thought to help direct attention to affectively salient perceptual 
stimuli independent of contributions from higher cortical processing.40 However, the 
amygdala also receives input from higher cortical regions in both the auditory system 
(auditory cortex) and the visual system (areas TEO and TE), as well as from orbitfrontal, 
ventromedial prefrontal, and anterior cingulate cortices. These latter areas are associated 
with the calculation of the predictive value of a stimulus (orbitofrontal cortex) and 
visceromotor control (ventromedial prefrontal cortex/anterior cingulate cortex). Amygdala 
and orbitofrontal cortex are reciprocally connected to all sensory modalities (e.g., feedback 
projections from the amygdala modulate the processing of visual sensory information from 
the first cortical visual area, area V1 in the occipital cortex, to TE in the anterior portion of 
the inferior temporal cortex) including systems responsible for somato-visceral responses. 
Together these processes form a circuit that both integrates affective and sensory 
information, and enhances and inhibits the encoding of sensory inputs relative to their 
salience to the goals of the organism.41 So here’s the rub. Affective responses are a means 
to encode the behavioral significance of sensory stimuli. Top-down projections from 
orbitofrontal cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex mediate 
amygdala responses and contribute to the integration of affective and sensory signals. 
Furthermore, the amygdala receives indirect stimulation from the superior colliculus and 
inferior colliculus (whose multimodal responses are already integrated with top-down 
attentional signals) via pulvinar and the auditory thalamus. Therefore, these cortico-
amygdala-affective and cortico-thalamic-perceptual attentional networks form an integrated 
system that serves to enhance the perception of diagnostic features in the local environment 
and inhibit the perception of local features and objects that are not salient to the current 
task.42  
 
 
3. Crossmodal Perception in the Arts 
 
The range of attentional processes that I have identified here can be thought of as common 
working memory strategies that facilitate the integration and maintenance of salient 
information over iterations of perceptual processes via a form of tacit rehearsal. For 
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instance, caudal regions of SMA and PM involved in motor planning, preparation and 
simulation are reciprocally connected with areas of dlPFC associated with visual spatial 
working memory and have large populations of spatially tuned neurons.43 Interactions 
between these prefrontal and premotor areas play a critical role in the translation of visual 
information into a coordinate reference frame for action and contribute to the visual 
recognition of sequences of events. Reciprocal connectivity between these prefrontal areas 
and sensory cortices encodes active perceptual information in populations of unimodal 
sensory neurons. This, in turn, biases perception to salient affordances in the local 
environment and contributes to the maintenance and reinforcement of task salient 
information downstream in prefrontal areas.44 Crossmodal sensory interactions contribute to 
these processes via a circuit that links the same prefrontal areas to IC and SC respectively. 
The circuits involved in emotional attention can be thought of analogously as supporting an 
emotional working memory.45 
 
So what’s the payout? Artworks are stimuli designed to trigger particular cognitive, 
perceptual, and affective responses in spectators, readers, and listeners. Therefore, questions 
about the understanding and appreciation of art are, at least in part, questions about the ways 
viewers, spectators, listeners and readers acquire, represent, manipulate, and use 
information embedded in the formal structure of artworks in order to recognize and evaluate 
their content … or how they recover and recognize those features that are diagnostic for the 
artistically salient content of an artwork. Consider, for instance, the responses of trained 
musicians to clarinet solos. In this context, the perceived expressive quality of the music, its 
affective content as measured by judgments of tension in the music, was influenced by the 
perception of smooth visuomotor performance. Here the diagnosticity of a visuomotor cue 
(it is not that the movements simply looked smooth, rather expert musicians perceptually 
recognized the fluid playing style) had a direct influence on the auditory experience of the 
music. The model I have presented suggests that these effects are the result of the 
crossmodal visuomotor processing on the encoding of auditory cues in populations of 
neurons in the auditory cortex. An analogous story about crossmodal visuomotor-affective 
interactions can be told about our capacity to perceive the expressive quality of actions in 
generic biological motion cues carried in point-light displays and dance movements.  
 
Let me conclude with a brief comment about the quote at the start of the paper and a 
suggestion for future directions of research. How can a piece of music sound like the bodily 
expression of an emotion? The studies discussed above answer this question. Dance 
movements carry the same expressive information, and thereby can be used to induce the 
same emotional responses, as the music they were set to. If the experience of dance can feel 
like the experience of expressive music, why on earth couldn’t the experience of music feel 
like the bodily expression of an emotion? They can. Vines and Chapados have shown that 
the experience of music can feel like the expressive qualities perceived in a bodily gesture – 
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or, awkwardly, music can sound the way the bodily gestures of a performer look like they 
feel. 
 
The case is even more transparent where theoretical intuitions mitigate against a listener 
directly experiencing the emotions expressed in dance or music (e.g., contour theory).46 
Research with point light displays demonstrates that bodily movements carry expressive 
information and are alone sufficient to enable perceivers to recognize the moods and 
emotions of individuals. Further, since dance movements and musical compositions carry 
the same expressive information, we can perceptually recognize the expressive qualities of a 
musical composition in the visual appearance of dance movements set to that music. Why 
then couldn’t one recognize the expressive qualities of a bodily movement in a musical 
work? Think of the issue this way (which I don’t think is particularly novel). We can 
recognize the ebb and flow of arousal and tension ordinarily associated with an emotion 
type in both the ebb and flow of rhythmic and harmonic tension in a piece of music and the 
dynamic features of bodily movements. This suggests that there is an abstract dynamic 
quality, a contour, which is generally constitutive of the content of an emotion and can 
potentially be realized in any of a range of media with adequate structure and temporal 
flexibility. I am content in this context with the modest claim that musicians use the 
rhythmic, tonal, and harmonic contours of their compositions as diagnostic cues for their 
expressive content and that these diagnostic cues are recovered by listeners via embodied 
responses that involve a range of sensiro- and visceromotor processes. Crossmodal 
interactions in the encoding of expressive information are easily explained in these kinds of 
contexts by the integrated crossmodal biased competition model of attention I have 
proposed. I suppose this aligns my intuitions generally with embodied appraisal theories of 
musical expression and emotion.47 I think there is sufficient evidence for this in the 
literature. However, given that these same processes are involved in perceptual recognition 
more generally, the model is also consistent with a cognitivist position like contour theory. 
Everything turns on how one interprets the information processing role of premotor and 
visceromotor processes in perception. This is an interesting question. But there is no space 
to pursue it here so it will have to remain food for thought for future directions another day. 
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